Dwight Stephens

Some Democrats continue to clamor for Hillary Clinton to apologize for her vote for the authorization of force against Iraq in 2002. She refuses to do so. David Brooks from the NY Times recently wrote a persuasive column, placing the vote in context (Senator Clinton’s personal context as a former First Lady familiar with the importance of not undermining the Chief Executive in foreign policy matters) and supporting a “no apology” stance.

Meanwhile, former Senator Edwards, who also voted for the use of force in 2002, has quickly apologized, seemingly trying to distinguish himself, in a matter of personal style at least, from Senator Clinton. As described by Frank Rich of the NY Times in today’s column, John Edwards “was as trigger-happy about speeding up the war authorization then (’The time has come for decisive action’) as he is gung-ho about withdrawal now, despite being an Intelligence Committee member when Mr. Graham sounded alarms about the Bush administration’s W.M.D. claims.” Seems like there is a clue here about Mr. Edwards’ character and what type of chief executive he might be.

To apologize or not to apologize? To vote for force or against force in 2002? How about a different question? What was the rush? We are reminded this week by Lincoln Chafee, former Republican Senator from Rhode Island (1989-2006), that there was a middle ground–”a third way ‘which Senator James Jeffords, independent of Vermont, hailed at the time ‘as one of the most important votes we will cast in this process.’” (NY Times Op-ed 3/1/07).

Just before the roll was called on the administration-backed Iraq war resolution, Carl Levin, Democrat of Michigan, offered a subsitute to the war resolution, the Multilateral Use of Force Authorization Act of 2002. As described by Mr. Chafee, “Senator Levin’s amendment called for United Nations approval before force could be authorized. It was unambiguous and compatible with international law. Acutely cognizant of the dangers of the time and the reality that diplomatic options could at some point be exhausted, Senator Levin wrote an amendment that was nimble. It affirmed that Congress would stand at the ready to reconsider the use of force if, in the judgment of the president, a United Nations resolution was not ‘promptly adopted’ or enforced. Ceding no rights or sovereignty to an international body, the amendment explicitly avowed America’s right to defend itself if threatened.”

In sum, the Senate was presented with a critical choice between two very different approaches. The vote against the Levin amendment was 75-24. The vote for the Iraq resolution was 77-23. Every current presidential candidate voted against the Levin amendment. A vote against the Levin amendment was a vote against multilateralism and diplomacy at a time when, even if the Administration’s intelligence had been accurate (which was not the case), there was no imminent threat to the U.S. A vote for the Iraq resolution was a vote for unilateralism and a rush to war, in which the administration overwhelmingly backed by the Senate said, in effect, to the diplomatic community: “join us if you will, but we’re going to topple the Iraqi regime with or without you.”

And, by that point, President Bush had already squandered America’s unprecedented “moral capital” following 9/11, when Le Monde, of all papers, cried out “Today, we are all Americans!” and citizens and school children from around the world sent drawings and messages of empathy to the residents of New York where they hung on the gate surrounding St. Paul’s Church for what seemed like more than a year as downtown New York fought to right itself.

As former Senator Chafee observes, let’s ask those presidential candidates who rejected the Levin amendment why they did so. What was the rush? Why did they ignore the warnings of our allies in the region, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, that, in the words of King Abdullah of Jordan, “[a] miscalculation in Iraq would throw the whole area into turmoil.” What, if anything, have the candidates learned? Why didn’t anyone consider what the history of the region had to teach us in informing our calculations about the aftermath of toppling Saddham Hussein? What do the candidates’ votes say about their approaches to terrorism and foreign policy? What do their votes say about what type of “leader of the free world” they will be?

One thought that springs to mind in observing the Bush administration’s painful and utter disregard for history is that every administration might be well advised to employ a “court historian,” much like the role Arthur Schlesinger Jr. may have served for the Kennedy administration, to help inform its policies and decisions. As Mr. Schlesinger reportedly said recently, “[h]istory is the best antidote to delusions of omnipotence and omniscience … [forcing us] to a recognition of the fact, so often and so sadly displayed, that the future outwits all our certitudes.”